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Abstract
This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploit
efficiency gains in the sharing of a risky financial prospect. Observations from a previous experiment had
suggested a general rejection of efficiency in favour of ex post equality. The p esent experiment explores
some possible explanations for this. The results indicate that fairness is not a significant consideration,
but rather that having to choose between prospects diverts partners from allocating the chosen prospect
efficiently.
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JEL classification D81, C91, C92
11 Introduction
Where several individuals have joint ownership of some uncertain financial prospect, such as a business
venture, the issue of efficient risk-sharing arises. Partners will, in principle, find it mutually advantageous
to agree an advance allocation of the prospect, i.e., a  contingent division of its proceeds, and to do so
in a way which reflects their respective degrees of risk-aversion. In particular, unless the partners happen
to be identically risk-averse an unconditionally equal allocation is ex ante i efficient. It is Pareto-
dominated by some unequal allocation which, roughly, gives the less risk-averse partner(s) a greater
share of the risk but also of the expected value.
In 1997 we conducted an experiment that generated some puzzling data in this respect. We asked pairs
of subjects to agree choices from among various uncertain financial prospects, our purpose being to
investigate the incidence of Common-Ratio (C-R) inconsistencies in the pattern of their agreed choices.1
In the process, however, we also asked pairs to register an agreed allocation of their chosen prospect.
We had 23 pairs, and all but one agreed an unconditionally equal allocation of each of their twelve
chosen prospects.
Evidently, equal division has some distinguishing property which, for these subjects, generally prevailed
over any consideration of exante efficiency. But this raises several interesting questions. Are partners
attracted by x ante efficiency at all? Do they recognise opportunities for achieving it? What is the
counterattraction of the equal allocation and, in particular, is it related to fairness? In our C-R
experiment the primary task for partners was to agree choices from among alternative prospects, the
allocation of which was only secondary. Did this somehow divert them from considering ex ante
efficiency, and thereby increase the relative salience of equal allocation?
The present paper reports on a new experiment designed to address these questions. In section 2 we
sketch t e theory of risk-sharing. Section 3 describes the experimental design. The results are discussed
in sections 4 and 5.
22 Ex ante efficiency: the 2×2 case
Consider a pair of individuals {1,2} with joint entitlement to an uncertain financial prospect of the form:
L ' [x,y;p]
That is, they will jointly receive £x wi h p obability p, andy otherwise. A contingent all catio of his
prospect is a vector of dividends  such that and . We assume that each(x1,y1,x2,y2) x1%x2'x y1%y2'y
individual i cares only about his (read his/her throughout) own dividends, and that his ex ante
preferences over various allocations of L are represe table by a utility function:
ui(xi,yi,p)
which, for a risk-averse individual is quasiconcave in . Given this, th allocation problem can be(xi,yi)
represented in a 2×2 Edgeworth Box (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: ex ante efficiency
Efficient allocations of L are represented by the dotted contract curve, characterised by the mutual
3tangency of the individuals’ indifference curves. Efficiency requires, roughly, that whichever of the two
individuals is the more risk-averse bears less of the risk. In Figure 1 this is individual 2. The contract
curve lies relatively close to his certainty lin , i.e., the 45E line defined by . Thus, for example,x2'y2
the equal allocation E is Pareto-dominated by allocations in which individual 2 receives a less-than-equal
dividend of the larger prize (£x), and a more-than-equal dividend of the smaller prize (£y).
The dashed diagonal line passing through E has a gradient of , and represents allocations of&p/(1&p)
equal expected monetary value to each individual. Given that individual 1 is risk-averse, any allocation
which Pareto-dominates E must lie above this line, giving him a greater expected monetary value than
does E, in order to compensate for the extra risk. In effect, this involves a Pareto-improving exchange
of expected value for certainty, with individual 1 substituting the former for the latter.
Although enerally inefficient, only E gives partners equal dividends in any given event, i.e., after
uncertainty has been resolved. In this sense, therefore, ex anteefficiency conflicts with ex post fairness.
Whether or not there is also a conflict with ex ante fairness depends on how this is defined. For example,
an allocation is envy-free if, before the uncertainty is resolved, no individual strictly prefers another’s
dividends to his own. In the 2×2 case, this means simply that each individual weakly prefers the
allocation in question to its corresponding ‘swap’ allocation obtained by a 180E rotation around E.
Trivially, E itself is envy-free. But, given quasiconcavity, so too is any allocation which Pareto-
dominates it. Defined as envy-freeness, therefore, ex ante fairness is compatible with efficiency.
3 The experiment
The main design problem was to present each subject-pair with a joint prospect of which we could be
confident that the equal allocation was inefficient. Consider the class of prospects typified by:
M ' [g,c&g;p]
where  and  are given, and  is a variable. Given sole ownership of such a prospect,p>½ c>0 g0[0,c]
individual i wi l have a most preferred value . An infinitely risk-averse individual will most prefergˆi$c/2
the certainty of . A risk-neutral or risk-loving individual will most prefer the constrained ,gˆi'c/2 gˆi'c
since both the expected value and the risk of the prospect are positively related to g. A mildly risk-aver e
4individual may also be thus constrained. In general we assume that  is unique for anygˆi0[c/2,c]
individual i.
Now consider two individuals {1,2}, for whom , and the joint prospect:gˆ1>gˆ2
L ' [(ˆg1% gˆ2),2c&(ˆg1% gˆ2);p]
The equal allocation E here gives each individual, in effect, a prospect of type M where .g' (ˆg1%gˆ2)/2
But the unequal allocation  instead gives each his most-preferred prospect of typeP'(gˆ1,c&gˆ1,ˆg2,c&gˆ2)
M. So E is inefficient, being Pareto-dominated by P. 
Our experiment was based on this reasoning. Eachses ion eated a group of (on average) twelve new
subjects at individual computer terminals in a single room. Apart from some oral instructions, pre-
recorded and played back to the whole group, the session was carried out in silence, subjects
communicating only with, and via, the computer. The principal instructions, both oral and onscreen, are
reproduced as Appendix A.
The session comprised two stages. In Stage 1 each individual subject was asked to divide, in units of £1,
a total payment of £20 between two events, Green and Red, to be realised at the end of the session by
the subject’s own drawing of a coloured ball from an opaque bag. There were three balls, two green and
one red, which the group was shown at the start of the session. Thus for each individual we elicited ,ˆgi
given , , and incremental units of £1.2p'b c'20
We chose the £1 increment for the sake of clarity and simplicity. But the necessity to restrict g (and thus
) to discrete units, however small, creates potential ambiguity. For any given pair, if  is odd thengˆi gˆ1&gˆ2
the equal allocation of L requires half-unit divisions, over which we have no direct preference
information. In particular, if  then either partner might actually prefer E to P.gˆ1&gˆ2'1
On completion of Stage 1, therefore, the computer paired-up the subjects, according to a simple
algorithm intended to maximise the number of pairs for whom . Stage 2 then f llowed, in whichgˆ1&gˆ2>1
each pair was asked to agree an allocation of L, in units of £0.5. The prospective payments in L  w re
defined with reference to an identical Green/Red lottery. They were the sum of the two partners’
respective Stage 1 choices, and thus differed between pairs. But the subjects were not told this, and
5indeed were not told the  of their partners. The two stages were presented as unconnected decisiongˆi
problems. In order to eliminate wealth effects, on completion of the session one of the two stages was
randomly selected for playing out and payment, the subjects having been told this in advance.
Each pair was given one of three treatments of Stage 2. These were designed to recreate, in graded
steps, a decision problem similar in structure to that of our previous C-R experiment. In treatment 1 we
presented each pair with a choice between E and P. Given a clear and simple choice between two
allocations, the first being wholly equal but Pareto-dominated by the second, which would the pair
choose?  In treatment 2 we did not pre-select or highlight allocation P. Instead, the pair could agree any
allocation of L,subject to a default of E. Assuming that they were interested in doing so, would partners
be able to achieve efficiency gains without external guidance?
Treatment 3 was identical to treatment 2 except that the pair was offered the choice of an alternative
prospect K, also to be allocated by mutual agreement. As already noted, consistent with the data from
our C-R experiment is the hypothesis that this will divert partners from considering unequal allocations.
It would be desirable, of course, to have a theoretical basis for this “diversion hypothesis”. One such
might be in terms of bounded rationality. In general, the choice between two prospects cannot be
separated from the choiceof all cation, since a partner’s preference will depend on how each is to be
allocated. Indeed, for each prospect there may be efficient allocations which re Pareto-domin ted by
allocations of the other. So agreement over the choice of prospect is potentially very complex for
partners.3 A great deal of simplification, both of computation and negotiation, can be obtained by taking
the allocation of each prospect as given. Insofar as equal allocation has any attraction, it may therefore
increase under such circumstances.
The alternative prosp ct K was £20 for certain. This specification had two related advantages. Firstly,
it preserved our own informational base. For any two risk-averse partners, we know that equal division
(£10 each for certain) is efficient among allocations of K. But we know also that in general it is Pareto-
dominated by P. In addition, at least one partner (viz., the less risk-averse partner 1) prefers the default
E. So, secondly, the availability of this particular K should have provided only a mild diversion from the
matter of allocating L. and in this sense a strong test of the diversion hypothesis. There was a downside
to this, however, as noted in Section 5 below.
In all treatments, Stage 2 negotiations were conducted anonymously, via the computer. Partner 1 made
6the first proposal. Partner 2 could then either accept this or return a counter-proposal, and so on. A brief
message could be sent with each proposal. Acceptance at any stage would end the process. In treatments
2 and 3 the number of proposals was limited to eight (four per partner). In treatment 1 we felt that such
a limit was unnecessary, as there was no distributional conflict of interest between the partners. This
turned out to be unwise, although not fatally so.
Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students at York University, being largely but not exclusively
economists. There were 120 individual subjects, and thus 60 pairs. Treatment 1 used 13 pairs over two
sessions. Treatment 2 used 24 pairs, and treatment 3 used 23, each over four sessions. In treatment 2
there was a bug in our computer program which led to a crash for two pairs. These two pairs are
excluded from the transcript (Appendix B), which otherwise presents a full record Stage 2 negotiations
and agreements, the latter categorised in terms of preferences as revealed by Stage 1 decisions. 
4 Agreed allocations
Treatment 1 isolated for each pair a simple binary choice between the equal allocation and ex ante
efficiency. The results were striking. Of the thirteen pairs, eleven (1:1-1:11) agreed to choose the
efficient, but unequal, allocation P. Eight of these did so immediately, i.e., with no counter-proposal. Pair
1:12 had a protracted dispute based, apparently, on some misunderstanding by partner 2. This eventually
had to be terminated by the experimenter, with partner 1 still holding out for P. So only one pair (1:13)
explicitly agreed to choose E.
Treatment 2 gave pairs a free and unguided choice over the allocation of L, subject to an increment of
£0.5 and a default of E. Figure 2 shows the resulting agreements. This is an Edgeworth Box in which
the axes are normalised so that E and P are common points, showing each pair’s agreed allocation
relative to the E-P interval. The figure therefore excludes pair 2:13, for whom  and thus E=P.gˆ1'gˆ2
(This was the only such pair in treatment 2; there were none in treatment 1 and three in treatment 3.)
Each data point is randomly nudged so that coincident observations appear separately. Agreements of
all pairs other than on the line connecting E and P are individually identified by that pair’s number.
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Figure 2: treatment 2 agreements normalised on the E-P interval
As in treatment 1, the attractions of the equal allocation do not seem to weigh heavily here. Other than
2:13, only four pairs agreed E. Twelve pairs agreed allocations Pareto-superior to E, or possibly so. The
first two (2:1 and 2:2) agreed P itself. The last of these (2:12) is the only pair over all three treatments
for whom ; the tickmarks therefore represent the £0.5 increment for this pair.gˆ1&gˆ2'1
Four of the remaining five pairs reached agreements inferior to E for one partner. The diagonal line with
gradient -2 comprises allocations which, for either partner, have the same expected monetary value as
E (cf. Figure 1). So the agreement of 2:19 is inferior to E for partner 1, who is risk-averse, since it
involves both more risk and less expected value. But for partner 2 it is superior not only to E but also
to P. Conversely, the agreement of 2:18 is inferior to E for partner 2, but superior to P for partner 1,
while the agreements of 2:20 and 2:21 are superior at least to E for partner 1. The final agreement (2:22)
is ambiguous. Quasiconcavity would imply that partner 1 prefers E to the agreed allocation, but since gˆ1'20
it may be that he is a risk-lover and thus has non-quasiconcave preferences. Nevertheless it seems
plausible to assume that this agreement is inferior to E for him at least.
Treatment 3 added another dimension to the joint decision problem, in that pairs had to select a prospect
8as well as its allocation. Table 1 compares the principal categories of agreement across all three
treatments. In the first column is shown the proportion (and absolute number) of pairs reaching an
agreement  Pareto-superior to E, or possibly so. The third column records pairs agreeing  E itself. This
includes 1:12 but excludes 2:13, each of which has already been noted. The latter’s agreement of E(=P)
is recorded in the second column as “trivial”, along with two similar pairs in treatment 3. The final
column records those agreements inferior to E for at least one of the two partners. 
superior  trivial E inferior
treatment 1 (n=13).85 (11) .00 (0) .15 (2) - -
treatment 2 (n=22).55 (12) .05 (1) .18 (4) .23 (5)
treatment 3 (n=23).17 (4) .09 (2) .43 (10) .30 (7)
Table 1: Principal categories of agreement by treatment
In line with the diversion hypothesis, the proportion of nontrivial E-agreements increased to 43% in
treatment 3, while the proportion of Pareto-superior agreements diminished to 17%, comprising four
pairs (three of whom, remarkably, agreed P itself). But the seven agreements recorded as “inferior” are
importantly different in character from their five counterparts in treatment 2. They all take the form of
an equal division of the alternative prospect K, i.e., £10 each for certain. This includes 3:23, for whom
, yet who somehow managed to avoid the trivial E=P agreement. gˆ1'gˆ2'15
Overall, therefore,  81% (17/21) of the nontrivial agreements in treatment 3 were for an equal allocation,
compared with only 19% (4/21) in treatment 2. Of course it is somewhat disconcerting that 41% (7/17)
of these equal allocations were of the alternative prospect K, which for at least ne partner in each pair
was inferior to the default.
5 Proposals and messages
In examining the pre-agreement proposals and messages, our principal interest is in discovering what,
if any, are the attractions for partners of the equal allocation. Following the discussion in Section 2, we
9might look for explicit appeals to fairness (or some relatedidea) i  the mes ag s. In treatment 1 these
occur only in 1:10 and 1:12. The former is almost paradigmatic. Here, partner 1 is initially prepared to
concede E, evidently assuming that partner 2 prefers ito P. Eve tual agre ment on P simply requires
partner 2 to make it clear that this is not so. So fairness, as invoked here by partner 1, is ex ante rather
than ex post, and provides no barrier to efficiency. Pair 1:12 is more difficult to interpret, due to partner
2's apparent confusion of his partner’s dividends with his own. But even if this is an oblique attempt by
partner 2 to be fair (which seems unlikely), the discussion clearly concerns exante preferences, so could
at best be interpreted as an inarticulate version of 1:10.
In treatment 3 fairness is mentioned explicitly only in 3:18 and 3:19. The former comprises an unresolved
argument about what constitutes ex an e fairness. The latter is more ambiguous, and here the message
(from partner 2) accompanies a proposal of equal allocation. But note that this is in response to two
successive proposals which for him are not only inferior to E but also ex ante unfair, on any plausible
definition. 
Across all three treatments, the only two messages invoking fairness in a clearly ex post sense are in 3:7
and 2:17, each accompanying a proposal of equal allocation. In the latter, the proposer elaborates by
outlining a  equivalent arrangement involving side-payments. But even here it is not obvious how he
would have responded to a slightly less aggressive proposal (such as P) from his partner.
So overall there is little support for the hypothesis that partners value the equal allocation for its ex post
fairness. Indeed, there is no clear indication that it has any substantive property of interest to partners.
Other than those already noted, proposals of equal allocation are generally accompanied either by no
(informative) message at all, or by some expression of ex ante preference, as in 1:11, 2:16, 3:2, 3:4 and
3:22. Perhaps the most plausible conclusion is that the focal-point features of equal allocation, such as
its implicity or symmetry, are more significant than any substantive property such as fairness. By their
nature, we might expect these features to be tacitly understood, rather than explicitly discussed, by
partners.
Our second interest is in understanding why (more) partners are diverted from efficiency when prospect
choice is at issue, as in treatment 3. According to the bounded-rationality theory sketched in Section 3,
pairs take allocations as given because this simplifies the problem of prospect selection. It follows that
if the attraction of equal allocation just is its simplic ty, a  suggested above, then it will tend to be the
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given allocation for each prospect. It is difficult to find any direct evidence of this in the messages,
however, with two possible exceptions. In 3:8, partner 1 could be interpreted as arguing for L, as
opposed to K, taking an equal allocation as given. Likewise, partner 2 in 3:17 is willing to discuss the
choice of prospect, but only taking “equal benefits” as given.
The bounded-rationality theory would also be supported by negotiations where partners argue the choice
of prospect, while proposing only equal allocations of either. Unfortunately, no such evidence exists
here. The only pairs repeatedly to dispute the choice of prospect were 3:18 and 3:19, interestingly also
the only pairs in treatment 3 explicitly to discuss fairness. But in each case there was at least one
proposal of unequal allocation, accompanied by an expression of ex ante preferences. There were only
four other pairs (3:1, 3:2, 3:4 and 3:17) in which partners differed over prospects at any stage in
negotiations, and in three of these an unequal allocation was eventually agreed, following some
remarkably cogent expressions of  ante preference.
Of course,  as noted in Section 3, our specification of K militated against disputes over prospects. While
providing a strong test of the diversion hypothesis, this perhaps makes the data les  informative on its
underlying explanation. In this respect it might have been useful to present each pair with alternative
prospects between which (given equal allocation) the two partners had opposing preferences, although
to be meaningful this would also have required a different default. But we had insufficient information
to do this. In any case, the fact that four of the undisputed agreements (3:20-3:23) were for prospect
K, equally distributed, makes this idea appear rather speculative.
6 Concluding remarks
We might summarise as follows. The pattern of agreements suggests that, where allocation is the sole
issue, partners largely favour ex ante e ficiency over ex post equality. Not only are they willing to exploit
efficiency gains where these a  plainly available (as in treatment 1), but they are substantially able to
locate them without external prompting (as in treatment 2). However, where allocation is not the sole
issue (as in treatment 3), the relative counterattractions of equal allocation are evidently stronger. From
the transcripts there is little indication that ex pos fairness is a significant consideration in this. A more
plausible explanation is that equal allocation is attractive mainly for its simplicity, that this is tacitly
understood by partners, and that this feature is at a premium when prospect choice is an issue. But
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perhaps the best that can be said of the transcript evidence is only that it is not inconsistent with this.
Even in treatment 3 we are some way from reproducing the results of the C-R experiment, where equal
allocation was virtually universal. Of course our aim was not to do this, but rather to isolate some
specific aspects of the joint decision problem. But it is worth noting some of the differences between the
conditions of two experiments.
Firstly, subject pairs here had to make one choice of prospect, compared with twelve (i.e., one prospect
from each of twelve pairs)  in the C-R experiment. In the latter case, the simplification gained by taking
the (equal) allocation as given would be even more valuable and, to that extent, we might expect more
such agreements.
Secondly, in the C-R experiment partners negotiated face-to-face, in private and without an imposed
bargaining protocol. It might be conjectured that the formality and anonymity of the present experiment
would have induced a strategic pursuit of self-advantage by individual subjects, excluding norms of
fairness which apply in less formal (and thus perhaps more realistic) bargaining environments.4 But, as
we have seen, ex ante fairness is not entirely absent from our subjects’ messages, and certainly not from
their agreements, of which all but a handful (2:18-2:21) were envy-free or possibly so. It may be that
a less formal environment would have eliminated even this small pocket of unfairness, but there is no
reason to suppose that, ceteris paribus,it would have generated a greater incidence of equal allocation.
Finally, we prompted individuals to consider carefully their ex ante preferences in Stage 1, and thus
perhaps rimed them to do likewise in Stage 2. Such cues were absent from the C-R experiment, as
presumably in real life. Had we som how been able to present the same partners with the same Stage
2 options, but without he preceding Stage 1 decision, it is plausible to suppose that equal allocations
would have been more prevalent in all three treatments. It is also possible that such agreements would
have been supported by messages invoking ex post fa rness, and even that the differences between
treatments 2 and 3 would have disappeared. All of this is, unfortunately, untestable.
But this raises the question of how successful we were in eliciting the true, considered risk-preferences
of individual subjects. In particular, we restricted the subject’s choice to increments of £1, mainly for
simplicity and clarity, but also to obscure the option of dividing the total payment in proportion to the
relative probabilities, i.e., b on Gre n which Loomes (1998) has suggested to be a focal-point solution
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here. Figure 3 compares the distribution of our subjects’ Stage 1 responses (3Johns) with the equivalent
responses reported by Loomes.
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Loomes (n=92) 3Johns (n=120)
Figure 3: distribution of gˆi
The two distributions have some common features, most notably the virtual absence of choices within
the £15-£20 interval, relative to the peaks at either end of it. This may reflect a focal-point effect or
perhaps an inability to discriminate more finely over this region. Another possibility is that the peak at
£20 is really a compressed tail, and that many of these subjects would gamble further if negative Red
payments were allowed.
However, there are sufficient differences between the two samples to reject statistically (Mann-Whitney
) the hypothesis that they are drawn from identical populations. The most obvious of these isp'.002
in respect of the £13 response which is (to the nearest £) the Loomes focal point. This dominates his
sample as both mode and median, whereas in our sample £15 does likewise. It therefore appears that we
were successful in suppressing this focal point, albeit while possibly promoting another. But this cannot
be attributed directly to our choice of increment. Loomes’s subjects were permitted increments of £0.1,
but almost all of them (82/92) responded in whole £1 units (the rest being so rounded in Figure 3). So
the differences are probably due instead to our presentation and description of the decision problem,
although of course the choice of increment has a bearing on this.
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1. Reported in Bone, Hey and Suckling (1999).
2. This is similar to a procedure used by Loomes (1998) as part of a quite different experiment.
3. See Bone (1998) for an analysis of prospect choice under these conditions.
4. This is a controversial topic, as reviewed and discussed by Roth (1995). In particular, there is
some evidence (notably Guth et al, 1982) that fairness can prevail even over the stark logic of a
complete-information, single-good ultimatum game. Strategically, the bargaining game embedded
in the present experiment is considerably more complex than this, if not unsolvable. For an analysis
of strategic bargaining games under various informational assumptions, see Osborne and
Rubinstein (1990).
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APPENDIX A
Oral instructions prior to reading Screen 1
This experiment is in two parts. Ineach part of the experiment you have to make one simple decision,
which will affect the amount you are paid when the experiment has ended. 
However, your decisions will not determine that payment completely. There is also a random factor.
Before being paid, you will be asked to draw a ball from this bag.* The bag contains two green balls and
one red ball. The amount you are then paid will depend not only on the decisions you have made, but
also on which colour ball you draw. This is, of course, twice as likely to be green as to be red.
Your decision in Part 1 of the experiment will be yours alone. In Part 2, however, your decision will be
made jointly with a partner. 
Only one of these two decisions will actually count. At the end of the experimen , you will toss a coin
to determine which of your decisions  (Part 1 or Part 2) is to count. Then you will draw a ball from the
bag, to determine your final payment according to that decision.
During the experiment you will communicate with, and through, the computer. It will give you further
instructions. You will have the opportunity to ask us questions, if these instructions are not clear to you.
Otherwise, however, you must remain silent throughout the experiment. Please take as much time as you
need to reflect on your decisions. At some stages in the experiment you may have to wait for others to
reflect on their decisions. Please be patient.
* at this point the bag and its contents were displayed
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THIS IS PART 1 OF THE EXPERIMENT
You have to make a choice from eleven options, as shown in
the table. Each option specifies the payment you will receive,
depending on whether the drawn ball is Green or Red. In each
case, the two payments total £20.
The safest option, at the top of the table, gives you £10 for
certain, whether the drawn ball is Green or Red.
However, the option at the bottom of the table gives you £20
should the drawn ball be Green. Here, of course, you risk
receiving nothing, should the drawn ball be Red. But note that
Green is twice as likely as Red, so the average payment here is
£13.33.
Alternatively, you may choose one of the intermediate options.
Generally, as ou move down the table, the average payment
increases. But so too does the risk.
There is no correct choice here. It is purely a matter of your
own preference.
GREEN RED
   
ÿ £10 £10
£11 £9
£12 £8
£13 £7
£14 £6
£15 £5
£16 £4
£17 £3
£18 £2
£19 £1
£20 £0
Screen 1: instructions for Stage 1
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THIS IS PART 2 OF THE EXPERIMENT
The computer has selected another person in this room to
be your partner.
You and your partner now have to agree on a choice
between two options, A and B, represented by the two
tables on the right of the screen. Each table shows the
payment which you and your partner will receive,
depending on whether the drawn ball is Green or Red.
Your task is to agree, with your partner, which of these
two options to select.
You may communicate only via the computer, which will
allow you to exchange proposals.
A GREEN RED
   
You £14.50 £5.50
partner£14.50 £5.50
B GREEN RED
   
You £17.00 £3.00
partner£12.00 £8.00
Screen 2(1): initial instructions for Stage 2 under treatment 1
(specimen example: money prizes are dependent on Stage 1 responses)
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THIS IS PART 2 OF THE EXPERIMENT
The computer has selected another person in this room to
be your partner.
As in Part 1, the value of your payment will depend on
whether the drawn ball is Green or Red, and you are given
some degree of choice over this.
In this case, however, you will have to negotiate with your
partner. The two of you may choose any payments you
like (in increments of 50p), except that your respective
Green payments must together total £29 and, similarly,
your Red payments must total £11.
You may communicate only via the computer, which will
allow you to exchange proposals. If you cannot reach
agreement, then by default you and your partner will be
allocated equal payments, as shown in the table on the
right of the screen. 
Default
GREEN RED
   
You £14.50 £5.50
partner£14.50 £5.50
Screen 2(2): initial instructions for Stage 2 under treatment 2
(specimen example: money prizes are dependent on Stage 1 responses)
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THIS IS PART 2 OF THE EXPERIMENT
The computer has selected another person in this room to
be your partner. You and your partner have to agree a
choice from two options, A and B, as shown in the upper
table. These are similar to the Part 1 options, except that
here the payments are to be SHARED by you and your
partner.
Option A gives you, for certain, £20 to share. Option B is
riskier, but has a higher average payment of £23.00. For
each option, the two possible payments (Green and Red)
total £40.
In addition to agreeing a choice between A and B, you
must also agree how to divide each of its two possible
payments (Green and Red).
You may communicate only via the computer, which will
allow you to exchange proposals. If you cannot reach
agreement, then by default you will be given option B,
equally divided, as shown in the lower table.
GREEN RED
   
A £20.00£20.00
B £29.00£11.00
B GREEN RED
   
You £14.50 £5.50
partner£14.50 £5.50
Screen 2(3): initial instructions for Stage 2 under treatment 3
(specimen example: money prizes are dependent on Stage 1 responses)
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APPENDIX B Session Transcripts
Within each treatment, pairs are ordered and grouped according to the type of agreement they reached.
Each is identified as “Pair t:r”, where t denotes the treatment number. Partner 1's Stage 1 choices and
Stage 2 proposals are shown on the left, with partner 2's on the right. Each proposal is represented by
a 2×2 table in which partner 1's proposed (Green/Red) shares appear on the top row, and partner 2's on
the bottom. In each case the proposer’s own shares are in bold type. The final proposal is that which is
agreed. Any accompanying messages are reproduced verbatim, except that “A” and “B” were used in
treatment 1 to denote E and P respectively, and in treatment 3 to denote K and L respectiv ly.
Treatment 1 13 Pairs
Pairs 1-11:Agreement on P
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:1
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
17.0 3.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:2
17.0
15.0
3.0 
5.0 
17.0 3.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:3
17.0
12.0
3.0 
8.0 
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:4
15.0
12.0
5.0 
8.0 
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15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:5
15.0
10.0
5.0
10.0
I like a bit of more risk and the minimum
value for this time is 5
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:6
15.0
13.0
5.0 
7.0 
are you ok?
16.0 4.0 Partner 1 14.0 6.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:7
16.0
14.0
4.0 
6.0 
cool?
17.0 3.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:8
17.0
15.0
3.0 
5.0 
 not that bothered...
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:9
13.5
13.5
6.5 
6.5 
15.0
12.0
5.0 
8.0 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:10
17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
E is more in your favour but not by much,
so fair is fair
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
P is better
17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
maths should tell you that E is better20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
ma hs is not always right and i want a
guaranteed 5 quid
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:11
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
I do not mind the gamble 17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
E has a better average payment
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20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
not really...only a little difference17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
the difference is small, but E is still a
higher average
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
the acerage is higher on mine but slightly
lower on your
Pair 12:Unresolved disagreement - terminated by the experimenter
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:12
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
just  do what i say. we will win17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
Im certainly not going to do what you say, 
E is much fairer for both of us
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
no way i will choose E, its P, go for high
risk high return strategy
17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
I d n’t want a high risk option,one of us
will lose out
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
no 17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
Why not? Don’t be so stubborn. We will
be guranteed some money rather than the
risk of nothing
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
i will not give in, choose P now17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
No. Why dont you give in? It makes
sense. Think about it
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
show me the money...choose P now
chicken
17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
You will see the money if youu choose E
as I want to. Im not a chicken,I just want
to walk away with more than nothing
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
rule no 1, never argue with me. rule no 2 i
am always right. rule no 3 give in now or
else
17.5
17.5
2.5
2.5 
Or lse what? Dont you try to threaten
me. I know Im right and youre wrong so
well stick it out until you change your
mind
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
ok lets make a compromise, if i win you 
give me all the takings and if i lose
17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5
YOu didnt finish your sentence...Im not
going to give you anything,look E is
fair,,we will both get a reasonable prize
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
just agree with me... 17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
no,agree with me
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
no 17.5
17.5
2.5 
2.5 
tough luck
Pair 13:Agreement on E
18.0 2.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 1:13
16.5
16.5
3.5 
3.5 
better on average
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Treatment 2 22 usable pairs (2 unusable due to computer failure)
Pairs 1-5:Agreement (possibly) Pareto-superior to E
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:1
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:2
25.0
8.0
0.0 
7.0 
18.0
15.0
2.0 
5.0 
21.0
12.0
0.0 
7.0 
19.0
14.0
1.0 
6.0 
There is no way I am going to accept an
unbalanced bid like yours. I am quite
happy if necessary to take the default
20.0
13.0
0.0 
7.0 
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:3
14.5
12.5
5.5 
7.5 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:4
18.0
15.0
2.0 
5.0 
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:5
14.5
13.5
5.5 
6.5 
hello...
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20.0 0.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:6
18.0
14.0
2.0 
6.0 
18.0
14.0
2.0 
6.0 
Confusion reigns
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 14.0 6.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:7
17.0
17.0
3.0 
3.0 
hello there i think we should keep it as it
is. we are more likely to get a green one
and either way we make money
18.0
16.0
2.0 
4.0 
I think it is a lot of risk with ur choice. we
should think of getting red and then we
will end up with inly three pounds soo
17.0
17.0
3.0 
3.0 
think about it there is a 50 50 chance of
this being played out anyway. have a
laugh lifes too short to take these thngs
seriously
18.
16.0
2.0 
4.0 
it is only forgoing one pound to get one if
you get red. then if you lose you get 4 and
not ree and still get a big amount if you
win. so?
14.0 6.0 Partner 1 11.0 9.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:8
13.5
11.5
6.5 
8.5 
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
14.0
11.0
6.0 
9.0 
Why syick to the default numbers, live a
little.
13.0
12.0
7.0 
8.0 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:9
20.0
15.0
0.0 
5.0 
hi there, I think my proposal is cool18.0
17.0
2.0 
3.0 
I think mine is cooler. What do you think
about it?
19.0
16.0
1.0 
4.0 
Lets make it like that partner. I am bored,
so please accept my excellent proposal
18.5
16.5
1.5
3.5 
think we cant do more than that. Dont
forget, the red ball could also be the one
in the end...
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 14.0 6.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:10
20.0
14.0
0.0 
6.0 
is your payoff the one you chose in part 1,
I chose mine the way like in part 1
19.0
15.0
1.0 
5.0 
r sk it this way its better for me
19.5
14.5
0.5 
5.5 
I feel like I am in a turkish bazar, how is
this one for you?
18.5
15.5
1.5 
4.5 
it’s the best you can get
19.0
15.0
1.0 
5.0 
lets stick with your first proposal then
Cheers
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15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:11
15.0
10.0
6.5 
8.5 
A good balance no matter the outcome for
you, an imbalance for me
15.0
10.0
5.0
10.0
14.0
11.0
6.5 
8.5 
It is not the chance of winning that
counts. I need some extra for the risk I
take.
13.0
12.0
7.0
8.0 
14.5
10.5
6.5 
8.5 
One green is worth 2 reds with
probabilities
13.5
11.5
7.0 
8.0 
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 14.0 6.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:12
15.0
14.0
5.0 
6.0 
16.0
13.0
1.0
10.0
16.0
13.0
4.0 
7.0 
15.5
13.5
3.0 
8.0 
15.5
13.5
4.0 
7.0 
Pair 13:Trivial
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 20.0 0.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:13
27.0
13.0
0.0 
5.0 
10.0
30.0
0.0 
0.0 
25.0
15.0
0.0 
0.0 
11.5
28.5
0.0 
0.0 
R u wanting a 20 20 split?
20.0
20.0
0.0 
0.0 
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Pairs 14-17:(Nontrivial) agreement on E
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:14
13.5
13.5
6.5 
6.5 
I am happy with these values
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:15
16.0
16.0
4.0 
4.0 
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:16
13.5
11.5
6.5 
8.5 
Is this acceptable to you?12.0
13.0
7.0 
8.0 
How is this.
14.0
11.0
6.5 
8.5 
Well, this seems better to me. What do
you reckon?
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
Le us just leave it as it is eh, you are
making some silly decisions. O.k.
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
Well it depends on if you are feeling
lucky. One more chance to change your
mind.
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:17
24.0
8.0
0.0 
8.0 
16.0
16.0
4.0 
4.0 
The default position is fairest. The
alternative would be 32 in green and 8 in
red on either one of us.  We then agree to
split the proceeds later.
Pairs 18-22:Agreement inferior to E for at least one partner
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:18
15.0
12.0
6.5 
6.5 
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13.0 7.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:19
12.5
10.5
8.5 
8.5 
what do you think??? 11.0
12.0
9.0 
8.0 
this is convenient for you
12.0
11.0
7.5 
9.5 
im not too sure err..but what about this?12.0
11.0
7.0
10.0
all right. I accept your green part. Now
you go on with my red, OK?
14.0 6.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:20
15.0
11.0
5.0 
9.0 
13.5
12.5
6.0 
8.0 
14.0
12.0
6.0 
8.0 
13.5
12.5
6.5 
7.5 
14.0
12.0
6.5 
7.5 
13.5
12.5
7.0 
7.0 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:21
22.0
10.0
5.0 
3.0 
18.0
14.0
4.0 
4.0 
20.0
12.0
4.0 
4.0 
18.0
14.0
4.0 
4.0 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 2:22
16.0
16.0
4.0 
4.0 
? 12.0
20.0
6.0 
2.0 
If we stick to this, and get red, youre
happy, if we get green were both happy
15.0
17.0
5.0 
3.0 
14.0
18.0
5.0 
3.0 
come on, this way i only get one more
pound than you, but youre playing safer.
ps are you a boy or a girl
14.0
18.0
5.0 
3.0 
Okay, but dont insult me...
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Treatment 3 23 Pairs
Pairs 1-4:Agreement (possibly) Pareto-superior to E
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:1
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
10.0
Imhappy to get 5 quid for half an hours
work If you want to have 10 quid, how is
this?
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:2
14.0
13.0
6.5 
6.5 
If you accept now, we can get the money
and go...
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
I prefer a guaranteed tenner...
12.0
 8.0
10.0
10.0
I really prefer the risk, so need some
compensation to play safe...sorry
15.0
12.0
5.0 
8.0 
How about this?
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:3
10.0
17.0
13.0
0.0
could be getting a full 17...?15.5
11.5
4.5 
8.5 
or maybe i could not get a full 17, if you
like a risk, could do this
15.0
12.0
5.0 
8.0 
just a little safer...
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:4
15.0
18.0
5.0 
2.0 
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
I would prefer less risk than your propsal
offered for me, but would accept a bit
more risk than this
16.5
16.5
3.5 
3.5 
17.5
15.5
2.5 
 4.5 
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Pairs 5-6:Trivial
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:5
15.0
15.0
5.0 
5.0 
L, 50,50,ok?
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:6
15.0
15.0
5.0 
5.0 
Let us be equal.
Pairs 7-16:(Nontrivial) agreement on E
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:7
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
Don’t mind K or L but lets be fluffy and
share
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:8
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
Seems to me that this is the best way to
maximize payment in a joint sharing of
the proceeds of the experiment.
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:9
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
proposal L equally divided. Agree?
14.0 6.0 Partner 1 11.0 9.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:10
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
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13.0 7.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:11
11.5
11.5
8.5 
8.5 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:12
16.5
16.5
3.5 
3.5 
19.0 1.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:13
17.0
17.0
3.0 
3.0 
20.0 0.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:14
16.5
16.5
3.5 
3.5 
18.5
14.5
2.5 
4.5 
16.5
16.5
2.5 
4.5 
Why do you put me at a higher scale. Is it
not better to have it 50 50?         
16.5
16.5
3.5 
3.5
Equal plit sounds ok...
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:15
16.5
10.5
0.0
13.0
L. If green, I make 6 pounds more, if red,
you make 13 pounds more. This favours
you. Comply or else.
13.5
13.5
6.5 
6.5 
10.5
16.5
13.0
0.0
Theres no point going 50 50, thats the
default option. heres the same proposal
the other way round. green gives you 6
pounds more, red gives me 13 more. OK?
13.5
13.5
6.5 
6.5
The default option is still the one involing
the mallest risk of the L opti ns.
10.5
16.5
13.0
0.0
the whole point of negotiating is to try to
gain an advantage and make off with
more loot than me. Taking risks is what
makes life worth living. COMPLY NOW.
13.5
13.5
6.5 
6.5
Sorry, some loot for everyone...
27.0
0.0
13.0
0.0
Then why not take K if you dont like
risks? This is my final offer, a bit
ludicrous but I can see you are not going
to budge an inch so what the hell.
13.5
13.5
6.5 
6.5
31
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 10.0 10.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:16
13.5
11.5
6.0 
9.0 
0.0
25.0
0.0
15.0
The default option seems entirely
reasonable to me. So, I send you this
proposal in the hope that you will
accidentally hit the wrong button
25.0
0.0
15.0
0.0
12.5
12.5
7.5 
7.5 
Enough of this.
Pairs 17-23:Agreement (£10 each) inferior to E for at least one partner
14.0 6.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:17
13.0
13.0
7.5 
6.5 
Is this proposal suitable for you10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
It is pretty sure. If you want to risk please
offer equal benefits.
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:18
11.0
9.0
8.0
12.0
How about this? 11.5
15.5
6.5 
6.5 
that was not fair,, was it? What about this
you get the same if green
13.0
14.0
7.5 
5.5 
It was fair multiply the green one by two,
and add it to the red one and theyre equal.
yours was completely unfair
13.0
14.0
7.0 
6.0 
what about this then?
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
That was unfair again. I cant be bothered
with this lets just have a guaranteed 10
ok?
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:19
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
OK 14.0
14.0
6.0 
 6.0 
Take a chance?
16.0
12.0
7.0 
 5.0 
Is this OK? I think if you want to take risk
you have to pay for this.
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
Oh, In wh ch case I think splitting even
might be best after all.
11.0
9.0
10.5
9.5
I change my prefferences now. But not too
much. Think that it could be worst the
next time...
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
Your last offfer was not at all fair. Lets
plit even?
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20.0 0.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:20
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
hello, I think keeping it all even is best.
What about you? What did you put for the
first part?
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 12.0 8.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:21
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
Is it ok?
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 13.0 7.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:22
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
Sorry to be boring, but Id rather not risk
anything
15.0 5.0 Partner 1 15.0 5.0 Partner 2 Pair 3:23
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
